1
The discipline of economics is very young. If we accept the prevalent account by which it was born sometimes in the 18 th Century -tentatively with the moral philosopher Adam
Smith and the thinkers who inspired him -it is less than 300 years old, an age which by the standards of the development of human knowledge might confidently suggest that it is still in its infancy. (Yet very fast it has been growing.) A unique phenomenon, compared with other disciplines, is that economics is not an only child. It was born almost simultaneously with its nemesis: anti-economics.
Anti-economics, as defined by its historian William Coleman (2004, p. 7) , is "one of the western world's more prominent demonologies of the intellect" and "an anti-economist is whoever sees economics as a bane. To the anti-economist the offence of economics is that it is harmful, it is pernicious. The world would be much better without it." Therefore the agenda "is not to criticise economics end lessly, but to dispense with it altogether" (Kanth 1997 , quoted in Coleman 2004 . Economic theory has been variously attacked as false, useless, or harmful; the practice of economics has been dubbed methodologically inadequate, conceited, biased, o r bidden; and the subject of economics considered overstretched in scope or overemphasised in value. Despite some isolated reactions, economists largely ignored anti-economics. "It is an ocean whose wild swell has been shrugged off, and whose depths have been left unexplored," Coleman (p. 5) forcefully comments.
Though the program of anti-economics, in all its varied forms, was perhaps set to a failure (ibid., ch.14), more pointed and constructive criticism has often succeeded in improving economics -a result anti-economists do not wish for. One recent chapter in the hopefully constructive criticism of economics dates around the early '90s, when we started investigating whether economists are more selfish than non-economists. The prevailing belief is that we are. And that we are right from the beginning of our career because selfish people self-select themselves into Econ 101, though it is sometimes conceded that training in economics contributes to making us yet more selfish over time. We thus have one charge: economists are more selfish than non-economists; and two indicted:
economists and economics. 1 We also often hear calls for correction: we must change the teaching of economics. In other words, this discussion resembles a trial.
On this matter I do not aspire to be the judge, nor an attorney on behalf of either side. As a young economics teacher, I am involved first-hand in the matter and I am probably biased.
I shall then content myself with playing the devil's advocate and, in the light of the piecemeal and sometimes contradicting evidence gathered so far, I suggest the trial is inconclusive. I also propose that additional charges, additional evidence, and additional implications are worth investigating to obtain a more complete picture of the phenomenon before calling for correction.
A TRIAL IN ECONOMICS
Between 1979 and 1981, the psychologists Gerald Marwell, Ruth Ames and Geraldine
Alfano published the results of their extensive experimental testing of the, back then fashionable, economic hypothesis of free riding. The idea (Olson 1965 , Hardin 1968 ) is that, when faced with the choice to invest in a good or service whose benefits are available to everyone regardless of who actually contributes to it (i.e. a public good), people will not voluntarily open their wallet. The public good is thus not provided (strong free riding) or provided in suboptimal quantities (weak free riding). The economic rationale for this outcome is that self-interested agents find it more advantageous to let someone else pay the bill for a good they consume anyway. Marwell and Ames (1981, p . 1) believed such claim to rest "on the strength of theoretical argument […] rather than rigorous empirical test."
Nobody was impressed by their experimental findings that there exists no strong free riding, but only some form of weak free riding. The criticism that our discipline is in conflict with empirical observations does not worry economists very much. In the 80's economists (believed we) knew how to respond to critic ism of this kind. Since the times of the father of homo economicus, John Stuart Mill, it has been widely believed "seldom in our power to make experiments in [moral sciences]" (Mill 1844, p. 146) and to arrive at truth via observation of facts 'vain hope.' The method of economics had to be a priori abstract speculation with a posteriori verification of one's predictions. Invoking Milton Friedman's (1953, p. 31) super-influential methodological essay, we also believed that all criticism against rationally self-interested agency (i.e. homo economicus), which underpins the predictions of free-riding, "is based on supposedly directly perceived discrepancies between the 'assumptions' and the 'real world'." 2 Such criticism "is largely beside the point unless supplemented by evidence that a hypothesis differing in one or another [respect …] yields better predictions." But Marwell and Ames (1981, p. 308) admit they "do not have a clear basis on which to suggest some alternative theoretical approach that might account for these results."
The first and most apparent problem, namely that economics is at odds with empirical results, remains disregarded in the literature covered here.
THE TRIAL TURNS MORAL
It is another problem that made it to the headlines. An altogether different reaction was indeed reserved to the observation that not every free rider is equally weak. Among a large sample of students, those who behaved closest to the predictions of economic theory were graduate students of economics.
Thus, John Carter and Michael Irons (1991) set to investigate the robustness and the origins of the behavioural difference between economists and non-economists. They conclude that some students behave more selfishly than others, because they are particularly concerned with economic incentives to begin with, so they choose to study economics (i.e. the phenomenon is explained by self-selection). Robert Frank, Thomas
Gilovich and Dennis Regan (1993) elaborated this point inquiring whether such difference is explained only by a priori self-selection of selfish people into economics or the exposure to economic ideas also plays some causal role, and found that studying economics has some influence (i.e. the phenomenon is explained by training).
These and other similar findings show that, when economists play game-theoretical experiments, we do not play like everyone else: our conduct is distinctively 'economic,'
while the conduct of others is 'non-economic.' But are these findings part of our subject matter? Is this economics? Do such investigations clarify any aspect of the production, distribution, and consumption of goods and services? Or do they explore the ways in which rational individuals make decisions on the allocation of scarce resources that have alternative uses? They don't. So, why bother?
Admittedly this can be regarded as a topic to be addressed under the rubric of Teaching of Economics or the A2 category in the JEL classification system. It is apparent that the 'moral trial' interpretation of these experiments is the most promising. And one does not even have to dig very deep to come across evidence supportive of such interpretation, but simply judge, so to speak, the paper by its title.
Economists are known for exceptionally sober prose, betraying a determinate attempt at establishing ourselves as rigorous (capital-s) Scientists while distancing ourselves from the unscientific practices of the humanities. This attitude, or ethos, translates in the use of a stylistic device known as "style indirect libre" (McCloskey 1983 (McCloskey , p. 9, 1994 . This way, economists signal that we are merely uncovering some hidden truth in the natural world and humbly report it for the noble sake of contributing to humankind's knowledge.
Economists' reference lists are filled with unexciting titles. Personal matters or opinions are not involved: economists do not talk about public schools or gender discrimination, but more soberly about "The Economics of Schooling: Production and Efficiency in Public Schools" (Hanushek 1986 ) and "Male-Female Wage Differentials in Urban Labor Market" (Oaxaca 1973) . 4 The titles of the papers involved in the debate about economists echo a quite different attitude. Marwell and Ames (1981) got it started with their paper "Economists free ride, does anyone else?" and Carter and Irons (1991) continued with "Are economists different, and if so, why?". R. Frank, Gilovich, and Regan (1993) then discretely asked "Does studying economics inhibit cooperation?," but after Yezer, Goldfarb and Poppen (1996) economists make bad citizens?" (R. Frank et al. 1996) . Reinhard Selten and Axel Ockenfels thus published a rather neutral "An experimental solidarity game" (1998), whereas Björn Frank and Günther Schulze wrote a working paper called: "How tempting is corruption? More bad news about economists" (1998), which was softened to "Does economics make citizens corrupt?" (2000) The titles (and texts) of the papers involved in the controversy, quite obviously, have a moral colour that is all but neutral. The authors are no longer Scientists soberly reporting natural truths, but men who have got something that troubles them. Moreover, while answering the question whether the claims of economic theory are empirically observable might seem like a relevant task for an economist, I remain sceptical that the same can be said about questions such as "are my colleagues and I selfish?" Economists disregarded empirical and experimental evidence for the largest part of the history of the discipline, chanting aloud repeatedly Mill's and Friedman's gospel. Why should we care, all of a sudden? And if we decide to react to provocations of this kind, while we are at it, why don't we point out that the assumptions of economic theory are (almost) respected in practice in a clearly defined sample of subjects (namely: us)? If there were a general enthusiasm in favour of economics, we would all sit down together with economists teaching everyone else how to be like us! But economics and economists are not nearly as beloved as we might hope.
The very choice of a null hypotheses like <H 0 : economists are corrupt> betrays the presumption that we deserve moral assessment, and that it is fine to treat us as guinea pigs in order to investigate how evil we are, really. That the problem rests with economistsand not more generally with professions or trainings -is indirectly evidenced by the absence of a similar treatment for other categories (except, perhaps unsurprisingly, business students). Though nobody seems to enjoy going to her dentist in anticipation of the pain dental treatments may cause, I couldn't find any suggestion that cruel people selfselect themselves into Dentistry, or that Catholics make poor students of Biology because they are warned not to buy into the Darwinian evolutionist account, nor that students of Law are ignorant of basic Maths since attorneys sometimes bill their clients for many more hours the y may possibly be alive. As for our subject, someone proclaims that immorality finds its "intellectual and theoretical justification in the name of economics" (Lux 1990, p. 129) and demand that this despicable discipline "simply be swept away" (Henderson 1981 , quoted in Coleman 2004 . These are sensitive issues, and thus Rubinstein (2006, p. C1n) thanks the many economists who reacted to his piece, confirming that his work "hit a nerve." It is sometimes suggested that we are in the presence of a moral opinion when the reactions of the people involved pass a threshold on a so-called 'emotional staircase.' If we disagree about whether red wine goes with fish, the extent of our passion in defending our opinion against the opposing view is most likely milder than the passion involved in a disagreement on paedophilia. The latter is then a moral issue vs. the former (Blackburn 1998, p. 9ff.).
There is something else at stake beyond intellectual curiosity.
A DISPLAY OF CHARGES
What had started as a (disregarded) epistemological investigation later turned into a trial on the economics profession, and eventually resulted in a moral assessment of economists.
5 A whole debate emerged around the selfishness of economics students in which it is suggested that -under numerous conditions, but not all -(1.) economics students display behaviour that is closer to the predictions of economic theory than other students; therefore (2.) all economists are more selfish people than non-economists. What makes (2.) into 'bad news' must be a belief that selfishness constitutes a violation of some social or moral norm. Therefore the charges are that (3.) economics students are immoral and (4.) we, their teachers, are selfish and immoral like them.
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The implications we may draw from the charges and the room for correction depend on the specific interpretation of the experimental findings. The self-selection explanation puts the burden of proof on the connection between selfishness and the predilection for Econ courses, which still needs to be advanced in a satisfactory manner. Should this connection be exposed, the discipline that proves so attractive to selfish people would then be under 5 Carter and Irons had interpreted their findings in terms of the correspondence of economic theory with empirical observations in an earlier unpublished manuscript, but later dropped the issue. 6 On the present occasion I do not question the equivalence between selfishness and immorality, but the equivalence can be denied in several ways.
some serious suspicion; though suspicion of what remains less obvious until the exact nature of such connection is understood. For the sake of speculation: if students chose their major by tossing a coin, and if by chance it happened that selfish people turn out head more often than tail, then it could be true that selfish people choose economics. But do they choose economics because they are selfish? And is this a bad thing?
The training explanation, on the other hand, locates the responsibility directly on us. It is us who teach our students, or give them reasons, to behave as they do. To uphold the impact of training, one needs not to posit (2.) and may simply make an inference from (1.)
to (3.). At any rate, looking at the texts, the accusations of immorality are difficult to find in a straightforward sentence, and hardly ever i t is possible to read clear allegations of selfishness or implications thereof. The most outspoken accusation sounds like this:
"exposure to the self-interest model commonly used in economics alters the extent to which people behave in self-interested ways" (R. Frank et al. 1993, p. 159) . So, where is the problem? Why the trial?
The way in which this literature was received and commented upon by the academic community seems well captured by Frey and Meier's (2000, p. 2) observation that the statement "economists are more selfish than other persons" is believed to be "a fact beyond doubt" by professional economists and probably most other scholars.
How did everybody come to this belief?
EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE
Many feel there is more to people than just greed and don't think of themselves as lightning calculators of pleasures and pains (à la Veblen, 1898, p. 73) . Most of them are not economists, for one (or several) of the following reasons: they are uneasy with extreme selfishness, do not expect self-interest to be of great importance in human motives, or they are not sharp-minded enough to understand the logical structure of economic decision-making. Be that as it may, those who already believe men are selfish aesthetes pursuing the greatest satisfaction at all times or display a certain logical aptitude might be more likely to find their way in departments of economics (instead of, say, sociology or psychology) to begin with. On the other hand, there is a possibility that attending too many Econ classes will eventually result in increased selfishness.
Marwell and Ames report a total of twelve experiments aimed at assessing whether free riding hypotheses are a good description of the way the world works. The research is roughly the following: subjects are provided with an amount of tokens, which they decide to assign to either of two possible investments. There is an individual investment, which is a private good: each investor receives a fixed amount of money as interest for each token so allocated. Alternatively there is a collective investment, which is a public good: now the interest is higher, but every subject receives an equal share of it, regardless of who actually invested and once a minimal amount of contributions is achieved. All the experiments are variants of the situation just described. While the collectively optimal result obtains when everybody contributes everything to the group exchange; each player is better off if everyone else does, except herself. Indeed, as mentioned, homines economici contribute zero. The authors come to reject the strong version of free riding (since people contribute non-negligible amounts of their initial amount of money to public goods), but suggest the soft version is respected (people contribute less than optimal amounts). Their results are that non-economics students contribute an average of 49% of their starting funds, economics ones only 24%.
Another milestone is Carter and Irons (1991, p. 171) , where the authors find that "a behavioural difference [between economists and non-economists] does exist." They randomly recruited a sample of freshmen and senior students, both majoring in economics and non-economics (and not enrolled in or ever taken any graduate economics course) and analysed their conduct in a ultimatum bargaining game. Here a proposer must divide a sum with a responder. After the proposer makes one part for himself and one for the other player, the responder either agrees to the split, and it occurs as proposed; or she refuses, and the sum is not assigned to anyone. Therefore, at the beginning of the game the experimenters asked the subjects what division of a sum of money each considered (un)acceptable if it were offered to them by the proposer, whence they determined each subject's minimum amount acceptable as responder. Similarly they asked the subjects to propose a division, whence they determined each subject's desired amount kept.
Economic theory would expect proposers to offer the smallest positive amount to their coplayers (e.g. 0.001%), so to keep the largest possible amount for themselves (e.g.
99.999%).
On the other hand, responders would accept even that small share because it is still more than nothing. The actual findings are as follows: non-economists consider acceptable 24.4% of the original amount, and propose to keep 54.4%; economists' figures are 17% and 61.5%. 7 We see neither amounts to the exact predictions of economic theory, but economists get closer. The reason appears to be that it is the most selfish students who choose to undergo training in economics, while less selfish ones find their way elsewhere, because freshmen majoring in economics are already more selfish than non-economists.
"Economists are born, not made" (ibid., p. 174).
Elaborating on this point, R. Frank et al. (1993 , R. Frank 2004 ) assembled groups of three students from different backgrounds and have them play two simultaneous one-shot prisoner dilemmas, with real money as payoff and confidentiality about their game conduct (enforced through the addition or subtraction of a random amount to/from actual payoffs).
In such situation individuals face a decision where a choice always yields a higher payoff (i.e. it's a dominant strategy), but which -when made by all players -results in a poorer outcome for each participant than she would have achieved if everybody chose otherwise.
Although cooperation is advantageous for both parties, economic theory has it clear that every rational agent will defect in a one-shot prisoner's dilemma. Defection rates are 60.4% for economists and 38.8% for non-economists. Once again it is the economics student who gets closest to the behaviour predicted by economic theorists.
The game, however, is about self only to some extent, because the payoff is also determined by the behaviour of others. It is likely that the choice to defect or cooperate depends on one's expectations of the behaviour of one's partner and, to be sure, the only way to confront a defector is to defect. The more one advances in economics training, the more one expects others to be dishonest and therefore, probably, to defect. 8 The progress of non-economics education reveals a marked reduction in defection responses, by contrast "the trend towards lower defection rates is virtually absent from economics majors" (R. Frank et al. 1993, p. 168) suggesting that "the training in economics plays some causal role in the lower observed cooperation rates of economists."
Altogether it appears that Steven Rhoads (1985, pp. 162-163) was correct in commenting, much earlier than these experiments were conducted, that "[p]eople who think […] narrow self-interest makes sense are more likely to become economists. Through their training economists learn that they and their discipline can be more powerful if […] self-interest matter even more than they first thought." But it could be expected that not everybody would react easily to the accusation of being a selfish person. Indeed some economists began to argue that the alleged selfishness of economics students was not granted, and conjured experimental evidence that contradicts earlier results. To be sure, economics students' behaviour deviates from that of the others, but in ways that are not always consistent or easily predictable.
THE ECONOMIST AS EVERYONE ELSE
However nasty and indoctrinated economists might be supposed to be, there must be some principles in their nature, which interest them in the fortune of others. By surveying university professors in a range of disciplines R. Frank, Gilovich, and Regan (1993) investigated their donations to charity, their participation in presidential elections, and their contributions to voluntary work (i.e. public goods). (2000) also demonstrate that students of (political and business) economics are about as selfish as students of law, but much less so than medical and v eterinary students; the most selfish are students of business administration. Interestingly, they do so not with an experiment, but by evaluating actual spontaneous contributions to two social funds: the one granting cheap loans to needy students, the other supporting foreigners willing to study at the University of Zurich, where the data were gathered.
What seems to be the strongest defence of economists comes from a lost-letter experiment (Yezer et al. 1996) . Cash-filled envelopes with an incomplete address were disseminated in classrooms right before courses took place. Half of the these were Econ, half non-Econ courses. Therefore 64 randomly recruited and unaware subjects took part in the experiment. Surprisingly, almost 44% of the subjects managed to forward the envelopes to unknown recipients, and this often required substantial effort: in order to send the letter, the subjects had to look up for the complete address to which money had to be forwarded (corresponding, of course, to an associate of the authors). Of the successfully returned letters, 56% came from Econ classrooms, and only 31% from non-Econ ones.
Once again, the evidence is not interpreted as an indication that economic theory -which predicts a rational agent would not return the le tter -is mistaken. The main result of the public goods and lost letter-experiments is that economics students are as selfish as others, or even less selfish than others. When put together with the findings discussed above, there appears to be enough evidence to deem economists selfish people and -incidentally -also enough to deem them not so. There is an apparent problem with this ambiguity.
What do these experiments show?
EXPERIMENTAL LACK OF EVIDENCE
It surely has to be proved that the kind of evidence referred to in the literature represents the best (or even an appropriate) tool for investigating questions of human morality and decision making at large. Experimental design and response measurement vary, so that some are possibly better than others. On the whole, however, the main reason for arranging experiments is to stabilize certain variables in a replicable and contextindependent manner (i.e. approximating ceteris paribus conditions) so that one or more other variables can be studied in isolation. In this way internal validity is established, or the guarantee that the choice context is essentially equal and constant for all subjects. The kind of control one may exercise on the observations, moreover, varies greatly depending on the procedure employed. Lab results, for instance, originate in "a highly controlled, very abstract, experimental situation" (Marwell and Ames 1981, p. 296) . Precisely for this reason, Yezer et al. (1996) are very critical of certain experiments, while R. Frank et al. (1996, p. 189) praise them for the "opportunity to control incentives to a degree that cannot be matched in natural experiments" and because these incentives "closely mimic [those] found in naturally occurring social dilemmas." If the main advantage of natural experiments is that subjects face the actual, and sometimes substantial, consequences of their choices, the main disadvantage is indeed that the experimenter does not select the type, degree, and extent of any treatment and she does not decide when and where the treatment should occur (Harrison 2004 In defence of their results, some experimenters underline that participants in lab experiments take their involvement "very seriously" (R. Frank et al. 1996, p. 189) , whereas another traditional critique of experimental methods concerns surveys (Boulier and Goldfarb 1998, McCloskey 1983) and it suggests that people are sometimes unaware of their beliefs or do simply have no incentive to disclose them, so that they cannot or will not respond correctly. A seeming solution would be to introduce a relevant and salient reward, and of which experimental subjects wish to obtain as much as possible -typically moneyin order to empower the experimenter to 'induce value' into experimental choices (V. properties other than obedience" (Starbuck 1993, p.76 ).
Other methodological concerns of experimental research at large also play a role in this context. Every experimental enterprise is subject to the problem of theory-ladeness of data, i.e. one's theoretical priors affect the type of elicited observations (Kuhn 1962) . By emphasising the common behaviour of economics students, for instance, these researches implicitly rule out the possibility that each individual is autonomous in his decisionmaking and that the higher or lower proportion of cooperators in a population might be entirely accidental. In a similar way, groups of economists are contrasted with rather heterogeneous and indistinct groups of non-economists, as if there were some pretence that these two types of groups compose the whole of society and that non-economists were all the same (R. Frank et al. 1996 complain against Yezer et al. 1996 that students of Biology are trained with principles of natural selection founded on self-regarding behaviour that do not distinguish them sufficiently from Economics students to serve as control group).
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On the other hand, there is a related problem of under-determination of theories by data, i.e. data alone cannot prove a theory (Quine 1951 legitimate to put these experiments side by side because they all amount to advancing a portrait of economists. These portraits, however, are not uncontroversial, which brings us to the issue of external validity.
Nobody would go through the troubles of setting up an experiment, incur the effort and costs of analysing data from multiple pre-tests, and paying numerous subjects, if all he can claim at the end of the day is that twenty-three out of thirty of his subjects defect under such and such manipulation. Experimenters believe that their subjects are representative of some population and behave in a way roughly similar to everybody else, so that their results are externally valid and can be generalised to the whole of the target population. Is this the case of the moral trial as well?
In order to answer, one must fist find out who or what is an economist.
WHO ARE THE INDICTED?
This much we know: economists are professionals, as witnessed for instance by a plurality of economic professional associations worldwide. Because the profession is not regulated like that of lawyers and engineers, for which there exist educational requirements and official licensing, it is much more difficult to establish when one officially joins its ranks.
As professionals, economists possess specialised knowledge, and this knowledge could serve as the basis on which to separate us from other professionals and from the lay public.
Though a coherent and comprehensive definition of the subject matter of our discipline may be very hard to come by, there are two acceptable approximations. The traditional one calls economics the science which studies the production, distribution, and The obvious reason why this is the case is that we know better than they, and one might try and tell economists apart based on our strongly held belief, indeed certitude, that we possess better knowledge of the economy than others… until one clashes with the boasts of entrepreneurs, consultants, and stockbrokers, whose skill to 'read' the economy makes their sixth senses tickle right before a certain bubble is about to pop or a certain stock go through the roof, whereas economists had no clue about that. They obviously ought to believe they know better. Therefore, alas, this criterion fails as well. introductory course, most of the times compulsory, seems hardly enough to make someone into an economist, especially if this person ends up majoring in a completely different subject. In some sectors of the American government it is enough to have taken four or more courses in economics to be considered an economist, but one can obtain the qualification through training in statistics, applied mathematics, or finance, so that the exact type of training one has received needs not be especially consistent or homogeneous.
Majoring in economics, on the other hand, may make a relevant standard. An Econ major must undergo introductory and intermediate theory courses and several electives in applied or specialised fields, and this could just do the change from layperson into economist.
Equipped with the right training and the right degree, these young men (and some women)
walk out of college in their full capacity as economists. But this capacity does not seem to last very long.
After the growth in the ranks during the 70's, the numbers have been going steadily down, somewhere around 30% for majors and 18% for doctorates, and the Ph.D.'s rapidly leave the country after graduation, signalling that many of them are foreigners (Siegfried 1998) .
Fewer than half majors continue their education beyond the Bachelor, and only about 3%
pursue an advanced degree in the same field, while many move on to Law or Bus iness School, therefore becoming lawyers or business analysts. Very few graduates call themselves "economists" when they enter a job (Siegfried et al. 1991, p. 198) . Quite soon, therefore, the majority of candidates for the label 'economist' do not qualify anymore. Also, what exactly is the job of an economist? We variously work in the public administration, in politics, in international organizations, in public and private research institutes, in different types of teaching engagements, in consulting firms, in the media, … (Coats 1981 , 1989 , Frey 2000 , Mandel 1999 ). Most of the economists, however, still consider the academia as our privileged career (TABLE 1) . After the graduation, some
Economics doctors look at the government and not-for-profit, and more and more of us Source: Scott and Siegfried (2002, selected entries) seek employment in the private sector, but the majority still seeks a research and teaching position in a college or university. Although it is obviously a limited and biased sample, one could argue that academic economists are appropriately representative of the profession.
-ALL ECONOMISTS ARE NOT CREATED EQUAL
Now that some ground has been cleared towards an acceptable definition of the economists' target population, it is possible to proceed in the assessment of the Moral Trial, and more specifically of its indicted with respect to the incriminating evidence.
The whole idea of a Moral Trial must rest on the presumption that different people choose different professions because of individual differences of some kind. There is some evidence supporting this intuition: different personalities indeed help predict different study choices and different degrees of rationality in the choice process. This very evidence, however, poses an additional challenge to the trial against economists.
Christopher Boone, Woody van Olffen, and Nadine Roijakkers (2004, p. 67) found that different personalities are associated with four different educational choices: Economics, Business Administration, Business Education, and International Economics and Business Studies. 13 These four could be presumed quite similar types of students, and one could easily group them together as economists-in-training, depending on which definition of the profession one embraces. One would not be surprised to see them labelled economists and contrasted with non-economists in experiments such as those reviewed above, although they are evidently heterogeneous. There are possibly yet larger differences between these groups and groups of students in disciplines such as Chemistry, Literature, Psychology, and Fine Arts, but such evidence is still missing.
The subject samples in the experiments mentioned above reflect the difficulties of satisfactorily define who is an economist. They included, for instance: first year graduate students of Economics (Marwell and Ames 1981) ; "freshmen economists, who had declared economics as their major and were enrolled in the first-semester macroeconomics course" (Carter and Irons 1991, p. 171 ) but were never taught microeconomics (p. 176);
professors chosen at random from professional directories, economics majors and 13 As often is the case with studies of this kind, Boone et al. (2004) do not study whether people with a given personality choose business rather than economics. It tests whether people who have chosen it have a given personality. Different responses in personality tests may be at least in part a consequence of the major one has chosen, and not entirely pre-existing.
nonmajors, and students enrolled in an upper division public finance course at Cornell (Frank et al. 1993) ; "upper-level economics classes (that is, courses beyond the twosemester principle of economics sequence)" (Yezer et al. 1996, p. 180) ; "students of economics, and economic pedagogy or agricultural economics" (B. Frank and Schultze 2000, p. 105). Another paper, by Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler (1986) reports findings from a Ultimatum Game that commerce students (i.e. business students in the Canadian university system) were more likely than psychology students to make one-sided offers.
The choice of subjects sample is problematic also in terms of its heterogeneity: high school students self-select themselves into Econ majors, are thus trained in economics, then they self-select themselves into graduate students and are again trained, then some of these selfselect themselves into teaching economics. The type of self-selection and the type of training should be different at each stage. It is not clear whether the contribution to social funds by graduate economics students can be immediately compared with the split proposed by freshmen in a Ultimatum Game and with self-reported participation in presidential elections by professors. Furthermore, R. Frank's (2004) and Laband and Be il's (1999) observations that actual professors of economics are no more selfish than professors of other subjects make it hard to purport that the experiments address economists' morality at large. Regardless of the attempts to establish this conclusion, it is not economists and economics teachers who are selfish: it is our students. The implication that these students eventually become economics professors does not seem to be probable nor compelling enough to accuse us of selfishness, unless we also posit some sort of ceteris paribus clause. In other words we must imply that that people never change, so that there is no significant difference between twenty years old students and fifty years old professors. I doubt such assumption can be safely made, in the face of contrary evidence.
To be sure, it is questionable whether first year undergraduate students of economics behave in a way comparable to that of fifty years old economists. But it is also questionable whether older economists would make a better choice: being wealthier, they would not react to the promise of winning a few dollar bills and the arrangement of meaningful incentives for the sample would make the experiment much more expensive; or they might even refuse to waste their time taking part in an experiment. These are very much pragmatic concerns, whose importance must not be underestimated (especially in the light of the tight constraints of research grants and because economics journals reject ipso facto experimental papers without an adequate induced value). But they should not be overemphasised either. A more severe problem would be that, being experienced, grownup economists often assume a more nuanced stance towards the experiment and behave in a more sophisticated way, so that the results would be less obvious.
14 Econ students, on the other hand, seem to be reasonably good subjects because they are informed to the economic way of thinking in a clear-cut fashion and still react to the incentives to behave accordingly. They are also less likely to be distracted by the attempt to understand the underlying goal of the experiment, but to simply focus on the task that is required of them and to thus respond in a way that is more sincere or at least less concerned with the implications t hat could be drawn from their responses (demand effects). All these remarks seem to boil down to one: economics students make better subjects to show economists selfish because actual economists would not behave selfishly enough for being accused of selfishness.
How bad would such failure be?
Absolutely indifferent, if one wants to explore an empirical phenomenon, but very bad, if one wants to advance a moral charge against the profession.
H 0 : <THE CHARGE IS UNCLEAR>
Another difficulty in assessing this literature is that claims such as: 'economists are more selfish than non-economists' are problematic. What does being more selfish than others mean?
First of all, in order to draw meaningful insights from experimental evidence, we must accept the conjecture that a selfishly motivated person will free-ride in the provision of a public good, make and accept stingy offers in ultimatum games, defect in prisoner's dilemmas, be dishonest when he finds a cash-filled letter and avoid contributing to charity; conversely, we must accept that someone who behaves like this is motivated by selfinterest. 15 Though all these conducts are arguably compatible with self-interest, it does not follow that they are motivated (only) by self-interest. And useful though it is in certain theoretical settings to assume self-interest as the sole motivation of human behaviour, the assumption is inadequate to address empirical questions about individual behaviour across a range of only marginally similar circumstances. Under such assumption, the only question that could be meaningfully addressed is how many subjects behave irrationally.
The authors involved in the moral trial, therefore, do not subscribe to the assumption, if only because it would deny the grounds for their very experiments, and for the whole debate.
Unqualified claims, also, make the concept of self-interest hard to pinpoint. 16 From the ultimatum game experiment one can derive the following behavioural implications of selfinterested motivation:
HIGH REQUEST: an economist pursues large individual gains (e.g. makes smaller offers);
LOW ACCEPTANCE: an economist pursues small individual gains (e.g. accepts smaller offers).
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Taken as general claims about self-interest, within a behaviourist framework where selfinterest is the only motivation, the two are contradictory. If we observe someone who accepts a small offer, we must conclude that he wants little money; conversely, if we observe the same person making a small offer, we must posit that he wants a lot of money:
these are their revealed preferences. I do not see any good reason to embrace such theoretical perspective on this occasion, because that would put a serious challenge on the attempt to suggest that economists are more selfish than others when they accept less money than others.
To be sure one can think about revealed preferences in connection with opportunity costs, so that accepting a small offer basically means wanting as much money as possible, because the only alternative available -rejection -equals zero payoff. And the two observed manifestations of self-interest can be made sense of simply noting that there is no contradiction in wanting a lot, but being willing to accept very little. One could argue that HIGH REQUEST comes first, but LOW ACCEPTANCE is better than nothing. But, if we are willing to walk away with very little, in a situation of sufficient uncertainty, we should also be prepared to offer a huge share of the initial amount, possibly up to 99% of it in order to keep at least 1%. I frankly doubt that this would in fact ever happen (or, for that matter, that on the present occasion it makes sense to employ a theoretical approach which admits such behaviour). It seems, therefore, that the ultimate challenge of the experimental findings presented above is to explain why an economics student behaves as a homo economicus, under the assumption that he is not one. It is thus puzzling how most commentators agree that best explanation is that he is a homo economicus, after all (selfselection).
The extent of self-interest is not the only aspect worth mentioning: its frequency is also a matter of investigation in the literature. Self-interested behaviour in ultimatum games and public goods investments can be of differing degrees. But in a prisoner dilemma a player cannot defect more than another, she can only defect more or less often. One way to cash out the 'more selfish' charge could thus be through a claim of FREQUENCY: an economics student behaves selfishly more often than a non-economics one.
The FREQUENCY charge, however, is not addressed by the experiments and seems to be altogether un-testable. It is possible to design numerous experiments in which economists behave more selfishly than non-economists, but it is also possible to design numerous experiments wherein the vice versa is true. A frequency claim would be very difficult to ground in empirical observations. It is not enough to observe that, in the majority of a handful of experiments conducted to-date, economists and economics students of various kinds behave more selfishly than non-economics ones. Comparatively, to be sure, one may say that Sarah is more selfish than Michael, if Sarah behaves selfishly in certain situations in which Michael does not. The question is not strictly speaking one about the number of occasions in which one behaves selfishly, but about types of situations. There are situations in which it is morally acceptable to behave in a self-interested manner (e.g. market exchange). What matters is thus the subjective perception of a situation by the agent. To prove economics students more selfish, one must make the case that economics and non-economics students perceive a certain situation as identical and that yet they behave differently. This is a very s trong hypothesis, even for money-rewarded experiments.
At any rate, one should not rush to conclude that any specific individual can be confidently expected to act in a way comparable to the aggregate behaviour of experimental subjects.
A subject could ans wer A rather than B because he misunderstood the question, made a mistake, copied from his neighbour, was contacted by a more experienced interviewer….
Only at the aggregate level, the results of experiments appear to meaningfully uncover new phenomena inaccessible to theoretical analysis alone. Sentences like 'economists are more selfish' or 'economists are less cooperative,' which abound in the literature, are catchphrases to convey the gist of the trial: they are somewhat correct, but quite inaccurate. We need a qualification:
LIKELIHOOD: economics students are more likely to behave selfishly than non-economics ones.
It can be proposed that a sentence like 'economists are more selfish than non economists' boils down to a statement about the likelihood that someone does something. Claims of this kind are very common in the literature. For instance, several commentators (B. Frank and Schulze 2000, p. 110; R. Frank 2004, p. 160 and p. 164; Yezer et al. 1996, pp. 184-5, italics added) suggests that econo mics students are "more likely" to make one-sided offers.
But such claim does not go deep enough explaining why they make such offers to ensure predictive accuracy, nor to advance a serious moral charge.
The LIKELIHOOD qualification, however, is not a statistical statement proper: it does not mean that in one hundred repetitions of the same prisoner dilemma, an economics student defects 60% of the times. It makes a claim about individuals (and not about a population)
by evoking concepts like dispositions, inclinations, tendencies…. Indeed, R. Frank (2004, p. 160, italics added) seems to produce a synonym to 'more likely' when he suggests that economics students " tend to behave less cooperatively." Because the evidence we are discussing refers to groups, it prevents us from drawing conclusions about single subjects and it also undermines the possibility to address the morality of individual economists. On the grounds of the evidence, we are not entitled to translating the charge on the population into a charge on individual economics students, e.g. by saying that economists share a tendency to behave selfishly. The little-advertised observations that 40% of the economics students cooperate in the prisoner dilemma (R. Frank et al. 1996) and that 40% propose the 50-50 split in the Ultimatum Game (Carter and Irons 1991, p. 177) do not per se deny this inclination. One may have a disposition to conduct selfishly, but some other tendency may prevail and prevent one from pursuing a selfish act. For example, one may have the inclination to cooperate in social dilemmas except when one expects defection. If this person always expects defection, she will never cooperate despite a tendency to do so.
There is no specific evidence suggesting economics students do ha ve any peculiar tendency in the first place.
To advance a claim about individual tendencies from the existing evidence we need to test several additional hypotheses: for instance that individuals who make the same decision in a game are similarly motivated, and that similar motivation in a given context (assuming again it is perceived to be identical by economics and non-economics students) is associated with the same personality -a selfish one, in this case. We then want to undergo at least a rough inquiry into what makes a selfish personality, maybe a character trait (i.e. selfishness) or some other psychological dimension (e.g. locus of control). All these reflections may suggest a different interpretation of the charge:
PREDOMINANCE: there is a higher number of selfish individuals among economics students than among non-economics ones.
The PREDOMINANCE connotation solves the problem of targeting a group instead of individuals and it captures the charges typically moved against economics -as the discip line towards which selfish people converge. The PREDOMINANCE proposition does not immediately follow from LIKELIHOOD, and it requires -at the very minimum -that people can be meaningfully called selfish. It seems to be taken for granted that they can.
But do economics students have the trait of selfishness? Or, even, is it possible for them to have that trait?
-ALL ECONOMISTS ARE NOT CREATED EQUAL (2)
To have a character trait amounts to being disposed to act in a consistent and reliable manner in most (or even all) the circumstances that elicit the trait in question, "even if those circumstances vary widely in their particular situational details" (Miller 2003, p. 375) . Character traits are therefore broad based, long-term, and stable dispositions to act in a distinctive way. They also have a causal/explanatory function in that we say that a selfish person behaves selfishly in a self-interest-eliciting situation precisely because she is selfish.
Several findings from social psychological research demonstrated that character traits alone do not explain all behaviour, also situational factors affect individual conduct to a large extent (e.g. Allport 1966 , Bowers 1973 . They even suggest that the common practice of attributing character traits to people is misguided. 18 For instance, Darley and Batson (1973) designed an experiment to uncover the major moral characteristics underlying the behaviour of the Good Samaritan. The subjects were students at Princeton
Theological Seminary instructed to go to another building to give a talk. On their way to
give the talk, subjects encountered a 'victim' slumped in a doorway. Only one variable predicted whether the subjects stopped to help: how late they were. 63% of the subjects who were in no hurry, 45% of those in a moderate hurry, and 10% of those who were in a great hurry stopped. (It did not matter whether they were asked to talk about the very parable of the Good Samaritan, nor which were their moral and religious orientations.)
Another example i s the famous study on obedience (Milgram 1974a) showing that 65% of the subjects, instructed to punish a person characterised as a 'learner' whenever he failed to answer correctly, went on administering powerful electric shocks that appeared to be lethal. One subject thus commented: "So he's dead. I did my job!" (Milgram 1974b, p. 88).
Unless we are ready to believe that the majority of the population have the traits of a murderer, we must interpret social psychological experiments like the two reported above as evidence that behaviour is substantially influenced by environmental factors and that character traits do not exist. Whence two implications usually stem: they can still be employed for explanatory or predictive purposes or they should be eliminated as a misguided illusion. Neither would be enough to sustain a moral charge of any seriousness.
On the other hand, it may be conceded (Miller 2003, pp. 381-388) that there exist 'local character traits,' which are activated in connection with narrowly defined situations of a certain kind. This leaves the open question of whether a narrowly defined situation might encompass both playing a prisoner dilemma and choosing a major. More specifically, it hinges on the presumption that defecting in a prisoner dilemma should be somehow associated with studying economics. It is admittedly the case that two distinct, narrowly defined, situations might activate the same local character trait. But such case has not been convincingly advanced as of yet.
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To make a significant case for self-selection in connection with the alleged selfishness of economists, one must assume that economics students have some disposition to be selfish and that they stick to such disposition across all situations. Alternatively, and more plausibly, one has to make the case that the conditions encountered in the experimentse.g. ultimatum games -are to a large extent comparable to everyday situations, so that subjects' behaviour in the experiments can be generalised to a broad range of human Ronald Ehrenberg (1999, p. 137ff.) , the relative income of economists has also declined in comparison with professionals in fields such as entertainment and sports. Put bluntly, if we are in Economics for the money, we certainly possess a large degree of idiocy to top up our greed.
Perhaps, there are alternative perks that make the choice of an academic career more appealing than better paying alternatives. One can think of intellectual stimulation (in economics?) or individual freedom to pursue one's interests (at some distant stage down the career path), but these are present (possibly in greater supply) in other fields as well.
Maybe a selfish person would feel more at ease in a discipline that does not condemn selfishness (but there exist other fields in which selfish people are not necessarily disparaged.) Maybe such a person would find it easier to learn economics.
Is it for some other reason? For more than one reason? 20 The classical interpretation of game theory is precisely that games capture the physical and institutional features of real world situations. But this is not what happens in practice. Instead, the theorist invents the rules of the game as he sees fit (Janssen 1998, p. 23) . A game is thus not a full description of the elements of a situation, but rather a description of "the relevant factors involved in a specific situation as perceived by the players" (Rubinstein 1991, p. 917) . Even in a strictly controlled lab experiment, the payoff cannot capture all the relevant factors for all players. 21 MBA data from Financial Times: http://rankings.ft.com/global-mba-rankings (accessed: july 2007). Law School figure is form http://www.ilrg.com/rankings/law/median.php/1/desc/MSPrivate08 (accessed: july 2007). Economics data are from Scott and Siegfried (2007) .
In spite of the broad empirical support for the self-selection explanation, any deepening or in fact any description of whatever self-selection amounts to or of however it plays out is lacking. Moreover, what would be the moral implications (both about the person and about the discipline at large) of each reason?
At any rate, even the identification of a more punctual self-selection effect would not entirely solve the issue. Would we still be entitled to believing economics students more selfish than others, if non-economics students selfishly chose law or bio logy because they expect to make a better career out of these majors, or because they believe these majors require less effort of them?
After showing that economics students behave more selfishly than non-economics ones in a given experimental setting, the 'accuse' suggests that this difference is constant and that economists are by nature more selfish. But some experiments cast reasonable doubts on such conclusion. In certain settings, economists behave like others or even less selfishly.
The 'defence' thus calls economists innocent. What they could further claim, however, is that much of the trial is (as of yet) ungrounded.
A SOCRATIC PROBLEM IN ECONOMICS
Self-selection has been so far identified as the soundest explanation for economics students' behaviour. Carter and Irons say this is all there is. From the observation that (1.) economics students display behaviour that is closer to the predictions of economic theory than other students it has been inferred that (2.) economists are selfish people. As discussed above, this claim has to face the burden of social psychological research that questions the existence of character traits like selfishness and the soundness of an inference of selfish personality from observed behaviour. Also very weak is the suggestion that (3.) economics students are immoral, until one makes a compelling case that defection in a Prisoner's Dilemma is coextensive with immorality (i.e. that under all possible understandings of the payoff structure, defection always violates the tenets of morality and that it is always morally inferior to cooperation). And the further implication that economists are (4.) immoral like them since we used to be students would also be speculative. It is not based on empirical observations, and it is actually at odds with several findings. Perhaps there is a 'temporary' divergence in the behaviour of those students who major in economics. But they eventually, as it were, go back on track. Economics professors are largely like professors in other disciplines.
Economists may be like everyone else because we know how abstract the assumptions of our theory are, and we know that the world is very complex ins tead. We know that assuming strangers to cooperate with us in prisoner dilemmas is unlikely to make us fit for a competitive world. 22 We also know that our lives require acts of generosity and altruism (though we believe that such acts make no difference in the definition of market prices).
Maybe it would be a good teaching technique to share all the qualifications with our students, but we prefer to pass on neat, rigorous, and clear-cut lessons. This is not without reasons; nor without consequences. Even if we resist the charges (1.)-(4.), therefore, there may still be room to complain that (5.) we are dangerous because we make our students selfish, and consequently that (6.) we are immoral for the danger we represent, so that economics becomes the stage for a case of what we may call a Socratic Problem.
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One of the accusations that lead Socrates to his death sentence was that of being a corruptor of the young because his most prominent students -Critias and Alcibiadesbecame a violent oligarch and a traitor of the polis respectively. The extent to which the Socratic Problem involves the teacher-student relationship in economics is thus dependent on the extent to which the social disapproval of students' behaviour follows from the doctrines economists teach and from the social disapproval of the content of these doctrines.
Do we economists, too, corrupt our students? 2006b ). The conclusion is that "Socrates' impact on his students endangers the polity" (Schliesser 2006a, p. 5) . Again, replace Socrates with economists to appreciate the conclusion. Elinor Ostrom (1998, p. 18) presages that "we are producing generations of cynical citizens with little trust in one another, much less in their government. Given the central role of trust in solving social dilemmas, we may be creating the very conditions that undermine our democratic ways of life." This is not only worrisome: it is scary.
Our students might blindly and faithfully submit to economic knowledge, and develop 'economic intuition.' They might then employ such intuition naïvely, without due judgement. They might try to imitate the smart homo economicus, without realising that he is just a fiction, a representative description of the sufficient individual conditions for achieving a certain equilibrium, which in practice is instead attained by a bunch of nonnecessarily-selfish, imperfectly rational human beings. But our students are not taught this, or not clearly enough. Our students are taught highly formalised technique s for
explaining 'why what they predicted did not happen,' as the joke goes.
Robert Solow has been quoted as commenting that "[t]o say something is wrong with graduate education is to say that something is wrong with the economics profession" (Klamer and Colander 1990, p. 18) . He was referring to the results of the extensive investigation of graduate education in economics at the top American universities conducted by David Colander and Arjo Klamer (1987) . That research focused on the content of economics training, and revealed a growing separation of economics from the real world. 'Having a thorough knowledge of the economy' was considered the least important factor in guaranteeing one's success as an economist. The top-3 aces up one's sleeve were believed to be 'being smart in the sense of being good at problem solving,' 'excellence in mathematics,' 'being very knowledgeable about one particular field.'
The situation does not seem to have changed much (Colander 2003) . To see its practical consequences, we may turn to a recent experiment by Rubinstein (2006) . The subjects wear the shoes of a Vice-President of a company facing a recession and must decide the number of workers to be laid off. Rubinstein shows that economics students aim for profit maximisation more decidedly than non-economics ones. In an alternative treatment he also shows that, when the problem is presented mathematically (i.e. as a function to be maximised), students majoring in economics, business, and mathematics all make almost identical choices -i.e. they maximise profits. For the economics students the difference between the two treatments is small. It is almost as if, even in the absence of the formula, economics students did construct the problem mathematically, as a somewhat abstract cost-benefit calculation. Rubinstein (ibid., p. C8) thus proposes a warning about the risk that "presenting a problem mathematically, as we often do in economics, conceals the reallife complexity of the situation." His research was indeed "motivated by [his] concern about the way economics is currently being taught" (p. C1). Our students do not "study economics," instead they become "experts in mathematical manipulations." 24 And he does nothing to hide his intent to "encourage [the readers] to consider changing [economists'] teaching methods" (p. C9). The encouragement is not solitary: a related suggestion -to change the content of economics teaching -came from R. Frank and colleagues (1996, p. 191 ).
I'm afraid we do not yet have a thorough enough understanding of the differences between economists and non-economists, and of the reasons for such differences, for us to change economics in a significant way, because, persuaded though I am that the methods and content of economics teaching are ripe for improvement, I must also recognize that Hirschleifer (1994) and Yezer and colleagues (1996) have a point when they emphasise that economics already includes crucial lessons on the importance of mutual satisfaction and voluntary exchanges. Nonetheless, the methodological, psychological, and logical complaints I advanced are not nearly enough (nor do they try) to call economists innocent.
More evidence is required to resolve the present hypotheses, and several additional hypotheses need testing. From these, one may find reasons to sustain different charges and to thus make more accurate prescriptions for correction (or not).
IS THERE A SOCRATIC PROBLEM? (AND, IF SO, IS IT A PROBLEM?)
It is not conclusively clear -though there are some indications -that economics training is responsible for changing behaviour. Our classes may indeed make our students behave selfishly in certain situations in which other students do not. One way in which this effect seems to manifest itself is by inducing 'cynical' expectations about others (R. Frank et al. 1993 ). When we play a game, or when we make a real-life decision, our expectations of other people's conduct matter very much. For instance, when we expect our partners to defect we defect, too. On this specific type of training effect, however, we should suspend our judgement. Firstly, because it is yet to be demonstrated that cynical expectations make economics students 'bad citizens.' Secondly, because this is a phenomenon observed elsewhere. For one instance, the majority of Dutch taxpayers say they pay taxes as a contribution to the common good. They believe, however, that the majority of others pay taxes only to avoid legal troubles (Andreoni et al. 1998) . Cynical expectations may be a prerogative of Econ students when it comes to game-theoretical experiments, but not on more mundane occasions.
The observed behavioural differences between economists and non economists remain a riddle that eludes our understanding for which several explanations can be proposed.
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One explanation is that Econ classes generate cynical expectations about others (R. Frank et al. 1993 ). When we play a game, or when we make a real-life decision, our expectations of other people's conduct matter very much. When we expect our partners to defect we defect, too. Beside the beliefs about who and how others are, also our self-image, or who and how we think we are, matters a great deal in decision-making. For instance, graduate students in economics do not consider employment in a private company (Stigler 1959) and those available to teach at some good liberal arts college or to take up a position in a governmental agency do not openly admit to it (Klamer and Colander 1990 ). This is not to deny the virtues of private enterprise and civil service. Simply, econ PhD's (ought to) want to do research at high profile universities. In a quite similar way the imaginary vicepresents in Rubinstein's experiment responded differently from the way they would have (presumably) respond ed in a scenario in which they wear the shoes of Labour Union representatives.
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Another effect of Economics might thus come about by means of 25 One possibility on which I do not elaborate is that the least selfish students of economics pursue an academic career. 26 This may be an example of how certain institutions modify individual perceptions of meaning and appropriateness, and therefore tastes (Danzau and North 1994, Hodgson 2003) .
altering our self-image, and this may occur very fast. There exists consistent evidence that the mere wording of experimental instructions alter the subjects' dispositions towards someone, towards some choice, or towards the process of making a decision; and they remain largely unaware that this happens. Because the descriptions are not given in advance, they modify players' conduct in a very short time. Upon enrolling, therefore, one may be instantly changed: first-week Econ students are indeed already different from nonEcon ones, if only to the extent that they are… well, Econ students. Being an Econ student comes together with a stereotypical image of a selfish person. 27 Besides the rather intuitive remark that stereotypes cannot do full justice to actual individuals, they nonetheless shape expectations, because institutions also affect the perceptions that others have about their members. If you always defect with me because I am an economist -and I know that you do -I defect in return. When I play with another economist, I again defect, just as you would. There may thus exist an identity effect that explains why Econ students behave much like economists from the very first days of their enrolment, by means of imitating some stereotypical image they hold (Lanteri and Rizzello 2007) . 28 The larger the identity effect, it seems, the less the need to invoke self-selection (though the two are not incompatible explanations).
Afterwards, with the beginning of courses, a priming effect might enter the picture, connected with the repeated exposure to economics concepts, but this eventually fades away after graduation.
Over the course of more formal training, moreover, there should arise a specific way in which economists understand and interpret situations -what we may call a framing effect (Lanteri 2007 Both the priming and the framing effects mentioned above are outcomes of economics training. Priming seems to be temporary -that is, to last as long as the priming is repeated.
This might explain why economists return 'normal' after they complete their training. If this is the case, long-term risks associated with the exposure to self-interest rhetoric in Econ classes might be negligible. The framing effect instead can be presumed to be longlasting. 32 But there is nothing unique about this phenomenon: it is part and parcel of the functioning of human brain and it is a consequence of training, learning, and expertise acquisition (e.g. Chase and Simon 1973 on chess players, Moss et al. 2006 on engineering students and references therein). The acquisition of expertise in a domain is associated with specific 'knowledge structures:' both the content of expertise and its structure are characteristic of each particular domain, and it influences "how things in the world are perceived and categorized" (Moss et al. 2006, p. 66) . In other words, it produces the economist's way of thinking. Alternatively, it could have produced the engineer's or the historian's way of thinking. It is also likely that such way of thinking reflects both on the self-image of and the stereotypes held about economists. Is our way of thinking worse? Is 29 "All other virtues follow," they further remark. 30 But even if behaving selfishly in market-like situations is acceptable, it might be not acceptable to always treat a situation as being market-like (Lanteri 2006) . 31 When one thinks of a situation as market-like, one presumably also believes, in that situation, pricing to be an adequate and fair allocation system. For an investigation of whether economics students like pricing more than non-economics ones, see Frey et al. (1993) . 32 A repetition of Rubinstein's (2006) experiment with the readers of a business magazine shows that readers with an economics background differ from those with a non-economics one, but their tendency to maximisation is much weaker than in the students' sample.
it morally inferior to others? Though speculations on this matter are not lacking, convincing evidence is yet to be produced.
Even if economics training had no effect whatsoever on our students and selfish people were simply born that way, one must also question whether for these selfish people to choose economics is a morally condemnable choice. What would be the risks of having economists do something else? What makes a selfish person a good citizen: that he becomes an economist or a social worker, a nurse, a civil servant…? Maybe, by luring these people into economics, we are serving a larger social goal.
I do not think, in the face of the existing evidence, that the moral trial should have major consequences on the economics profession as a whole, nor on economics teaching. Or, more specifically, not yet. It may be true that we induce selfish behaviour (with a huge list of qualifications due) in our students. But this effect appears to largely wear off with time.
In the meanwhile, to be sure, they may earn a reputation of nastiness, which would harm them forever, but I doubt that this case can be seriously advanced.
Neither do I think that everything is fine with economics and economics teaching. Far from it. My feeling is that we should worry, but not too much, about how bad citizens our graduates turn out to be. What seems to me much more shameful and ethically troublesome is the massive investment in technical expertise that shields our students from the exploration and the understanding of real-world phenomena. In my opinion, the moral trial suggests that, as a by-product of econ education, we induce them to endorse a line of conduct that they will (hopefully) abandon later on. Hardly a worthy accomplishment.
